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In this work, I focus on discussing selected aspects of the relationship 
between social media and the capitalist crisis. Detailed critical analyses of 
political, economic and ideological aspects of social media can be found in 
associated publications (Fuchs, 2017, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2015, 2014a, 
2014b, 2014c; Fuchs & Mosco, 2016; Fuchs & Sandoval, 2014; Fisher & 
Fuchs, 2015; Trottier & Fuchs, 2014; Fuchs et al., 2012). I first give an 
introduction to Marxist crisis theory (section 14.2) and summarise my analysis 
of the crisis (section 14.3), then discuss aspects of targeted advertising 
(section 14.4), the ideology of Twitter revolutions (section 14.5), and anti-
socialist ideology on Twitter (section 14.6). The basic point the chapter makes 
is that capitalist development is an important factor that has conditioned the 
emergence of social media, social media’s economy and ideology on social 
media.  
 
14.2. Foundations of Crisis Theory 
 
The profit rate is a key category of Marxist political economy (Marx, 1867: 
chapter 17; for a discussion see: Fuchs, 2016b, chapter 17).  
 
The rate of profit is the relationship of profit and investment or of the monetary 
expression of surplus-value and the value of the means of production 
(constant and variable capital). The profit rate expresses to which degree 
capitalism is grown or shrinking, it is a measure of accumulation and crisis.  
 𝑅𝑂𝑃 = 𝑠𝑐 + 𝑣 
s…surplus-value/profit, c… constant capital, v….variable capital 
 
If we divide the numerator and the denominator by v, then we get: 
 𝑅𝑂𝑃 = 𝑠𝑣𝑐𝑣 + 1  
 
This formula shows that the rate of profit depends a) on the rate of surplus 
value s/v that Marx also calls the rate of exploitation because it described the 
relationship of unpaid and paid labour and b) the organic composition of 
capital c/v that represents the relationship of dead and living labour, constant 
and variable capital, the value of machinery/resources and labour-power. The 
organic composition is a measure of an economy’s technological intensity. 
The rate of profit is directly proportional to the rate of surplus-value and 
indirectly proportional to the organic composition of capital. 
 
New technology has the potential to both increase the rate of surplus-value 
and the organic composition of capital. The effects of new technology on the 
rate of profit depend on the relationship between the rate of surplus-value and 
the organic composition. If the organic composition increases more than the 
rate of surplus-value, then a fall of the rate of profit emerges. Vice versa, if the 
rate of surplus-value increases more than the organic composition, then the 
rate of profit decreases. An important factor in this respect is class struggle 
that influences the absolute value of variable capital v. In any case, the 
formula for the rate of profit shows that technification has contradictory 
potentials: it can increase the investment costs, productivity, and the 
exploitation of labour. 
 
The increase of the organic composition as structural tendency of capital 
stands in a contradiction with class struggles. The outcomes of this 
contradiction cannot be predicted in advance, but depend on historical 
circumstances. If the organic composition increases and there are no or 
unsuccessful workers’ struggles so that the wage sum decreases, then the 
rate of profit can increase. If however workers’ struggles are successful and 
they resist lay-offs and achieve wage-increases, the profit rate is more likely 
to fall. 
 
14.3. Capitalist Crisis 
 
Figures 14.1 and 14.2 show the development of the rate of profit, the organic 
composition, and the rate of surplus-value in the USA and the EU15 
countries. 
 
Figure 14.1: Economic development in the USA 
 
 
Figure 14.2: Economic development in the EU15 countries 
 
The rate of surplus-value, i.e. the degree of exploitation, decreased in the 
1960s and was relatively low in the 1970s in both the USA and the EU15. This 
is an indication that working class struggles were relatively successful in this 
time period and resulted in relative wage increases. In the early 1980s, the 
time of the rise of neoliberal politics such as Reagonomics and Thatcherism, 
the degree of exploitation started a long-term increase caused by wage 
repression.  
 
The time period 1960-2015 is one, in which the computer has arisen, shaped, 
and transformed capitalist economies. As a result, both in the USA and the 
EU15 countries the organic composition has in this period covering 55 years 
increased from around 20% to almost 30%, which confirms Marx’s analysis 
that there is a tendency of the organic composition to rise that results from the 
technification and scientification of production. The rate of profit in both the 
US and the EU dropped as a result of increasing wages and the working 
class’ struggles in the 1960s until the middle of the 1970s, the time of a large 
global economic crisis.  
 
The wage share is the share of the total wages in the gross domestic product, 
whereas the capital share is the share of capital (profits and constant capital) 
in the GDP. These two shares are indicators of the power of labour and 
capital. Figures 3 and 4 show the development of these two variables in the 
USA and the EU. 
 
 
Figure 14.3: The wage share in the USA and the EU 
 
 
Figure 14.4: The capital share in the USA and the EU 
 
From the early 1960s until the mid-1970s, the wage share increased in both 
the USA and the EU, which signified an increasing power of the working class 
and relatively successful class struggles during this period that compelled 
capital to increase wages. In the mid 1970s a period of wage repression 
started in both the EU and the US, which result in significant drops in the 
wage share. At the same time, the share of capital in the total economy 
increased.  
 
Since the mid 1970s, two contradictory tendencies have shaped capitalism: a) 
computerisation’s increase of the organic composition that resulted in 
increasing constant capital costs; b) top-down capitalist class struggle that 
decreased the wage share. As a result, the profit rate remained relatively 
constant and never returned to the levels of the 1960s. Capital was therefore 
searching for other ways for making profits, which resulted in an increased 
financialisation of capitalism. Significant shares of profits were invested in 
finance because capital is driven by the need to accumulate ever more profits 
and financial speculation promised high returns. The volatility of the economy 
steadily increased.  
 
The share of the finance industry in the total value added has in many 
countries significantly increased. A general increase can be observed that has 
been especially strong in the USA, where the share has doubled from 1970 
until 2005, when it made up 8.1% of the US economy’s total value added 
(data source: data source: OECD iLibrary, STAN, financial industry=ISIC Rev. 
3: C65-C67). There has been an increasing financialisation of capitalism. 
 
The rise of neoliberalism resulted in relative stagnation and wage losses, 
whereas profits rapidly increased. Neoliberalism therefore is a class struggle 
project of the ruling class aiming at increasing profits by decreasing wages 
with the help of strategies such as deregulation of labour laws, precarious 
labour conditions, welfare and public expenditure cuts, tax cuts for the rich 
and companies, the privatisation of public goods, the global offshoring and 
outsourcing of labour, etc. Many working families had to take out loans, 
consumer credits and mortgages in order to be able to pay for their everyday 
life requirements. At the same time, capital investment into high-risk financial 
instruments boomed because the growing profits needed to be reinvested. 
These high-risk financial instruments included Asset Backed Securities (ABS), 
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) 
and Credit Default Swaps (CDS). The financial market promised high financial 
gains, but the profits in the non-financial economy could in the long run not 
fulfil these growth expectations, which created a mismatch between financial 
values and the profits of corporations, and the expectations of shareholders 
and the reality of capitalist accumulation. The results were financial bubbles 
that burst in the 2008 crisis. 
 
The data show that the capitalist economy has since the middle of the 1970s 
been shaped by the capitalist class’ neoliberal struggle against the working 
class, increasing inequality between capital and labour, an increase of 
household debts, a decrease of capital taxation, a rising financialisation of the 
economy and as a consequence an increased crisis volatility. The 
contradictions between capital and labour, fictitious value and actual profit, the 
production and consumption/investment of capital were heightened by the 
development dynamics of neoliberal capitalism and finally resulted in a new 
world economic crisis and a crisis of capitalist society. 
 
Sections 14.4, 14.5 and 14.6 aim to show that capitalism and its crisis are an 
important factor that has shaped social media. One aspect is that capitalism’s 
crisis has favoured the expansion of targeted online advertising.  
 
14.4. Targeted Advertising and the Crisis 
 
Table 14.1 shows the development of global advertising revenues. Whereas 
the share of broadcast advertising (radio and television) has in the years from 
2009 until 2013 slightly declined from 43.6% to 42.0%, the decline was more 
drastic in the print industry, where the share went from 32.4% to 25.2%. At the 
same time, the share of Internet advertising increased from 15.7% to 24.8%. 
These statistical data give grounds to the assumption that advertisers find 
online advertising more secure than other forms of advertising because it can 
be targeted, personalised, and it is based on consumer- and user-
surveillance. The new capitalist crisis may have accelerated this shift from 
traditional advertising to online advertising because corporations are then 
especially afraid of bankruptcy and making losses. The crisis of journalism 
and the print news media stands in the context of the commercialisation of the 
media and the changes in advertising. In the UK, 37.1% of advertising 
revenue was spent in the online industry, 28.3% in broadcasting, 18.7% in the 
print industry, 9.5% on direct mail advertising, 5.3% on outdoor ads, and 1.0% 
in the movie industry (Ofcom, 2015: 375).  
 
In 2014, Google had a share of 31.10% in global digital ad revenue, Facebook 
7.75%, Baidu 4.68%, Alibaba 4.66%, Microsoft 2.72%, Yahoo! 2.36%, IAC 
1.00%, Twitter 0.84%, Tencent 0.83%, AOL 0.81%, Amazon 0.70%, Pandora 
0.50%, LinkedIn 0.49%, SINA 0.38%, Yelp 0.24%, and Millennial Media 
0.08%1. Such data indicate that Google, Facebook and Baidu are the key 
beneficiaries of Internet advertising’s growth. One should not be mistaken: 
Google, Facebook and Baidu are not communications companies. They do 
not sell digital content or access to online platforms. They are some of the 
world’s largest advertising companies. They sell user data as commodity to 
advertisers, who in return can present targeted ads to users: In 2014, 89% of 
Google’s revenues came from advertising (data source: SEC-Filings Google, 
Form 10-K 2014). In the case of Facebook this figure was 92% in 2014 (data 
source: SEC-Filings Facebook, Form 10-K 2014), for Baidu it was in the same 
year 98.9% online marketing services (data source: SEC-Filings Baidu, Form 
20-F 2014).  
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Television 84.5 93.9 98.0 102.8 105.2 
Internet 37.5 44.7 54.6 63.8 75.0 
Newspape
rs 
55.0 54.8 54.3 53.0 52.2 
Magazines 22.6 23.4 24.0 23.9 23.9 
Outdoor 18.6 20.0 21.0 21.6 22.6 
Radio 20.0 20.4 20.9 21.3 21.8 
Cinema 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Total 239.5 258.6 274.3 288 302.4 
Television 




15.7% 17.3% 19.9% 22.2% 
24.8
% 
Newspape 23.0% 21.2% 19.8% 18.4% 17.3
                                                            
1 China’s leading ad sellers to take 10% of the worldwide digital market this year. eMarketer, 
December 16, 2014. 
rs % 
Magazines 9.4% 9.0% 8.7% 8.3% 7.9% 
Outdoor 7.8% 7.7% 7.7% 7.5% 7.5% 
Radio 8.4% 7.9% 7.6% 7.4% 7.2% 
Cinema 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 
Table 14.1: The development of global advertising revenue, in £ billion 
and % of total ad revenue. Data source: Ofcom (2014, 22) 
 
Google and Facebook are very profitable companies (see figures 14.5 and 
14.6). They not only monopolise online search and online social networking, 
but are also key players in the business of targeted advertising. In 2016, 
Google was the world’s 27th largest transnational company and Facebook the 
188th largest (data source: Forbes 2000 [2016]). 
 
 
Figure 14.5: The development of Google’s profits, in billion US$. Data 
source: SEC-filings, from 10-k, various years. 
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Figure 14.6: The development of Facebook’s profits, 2007–2014, in 
million US$ 
 
Twitter has been struggling financially: It became a stock-traded public 
company in November 2013, although its annual net losses were US$ 645.32 
million in 2013 (Twitter SEC filings, form 10-K 2013). Weibo – a subsidiary of 
Sina – made losses of US$ 116.74 million in 2011, 102.47 million in 2012, 
38.12 million in 2013, and 62.7 million in 2014 (Weibo SEC filings, form F-1 
registration statement).  
Just like Twitter in 2013, Weibo became a stock-marketed listed corporation in 
April 2014 when it made its Initial Public Offering (IPO) on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange. And also like Twitter it made this move although it had made 
significant losses in the previous years and continued to make a total loss of 
US$ 62.6 million in financial year 2014. Weibo and Twitter’s share values 
have been fluctuating. In December 2014, eight months after its IPO, Weibo’s 
share value dropped below its initial value of US$ 17. The same happened to 
Twitter’s share value in August 2015, when it dropped below the initial value 
of US$ 26. Both shares have been fluctuating and volatile. They have until 
late 2015 not seen large increases. 
 
Twitter and Weibo are not communications companies, but predominantly 
large advertising agencies. Targeted advertising is their main revenue source. 
85% of Twitter’s revenues came from advertising in 2012 and 89% in 2013 
(Twitter SEC filings, form 10-K: annual report for 2013). 78.8% of Weibo’s 
revenues were in 2013 derived from advertising and marketing, 12.2% from 
games, and 5.9% from VIP membership services (Weibo SEC filings, form F-
1, registration statement). In 2014, Weibo generated 79% of its revenue from 
advertising and marketing (ibid.). The rest of the revenue was made from 
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Weibo and Twitter are high-risk financial companies because they have been 
listed on the stock market without making profits. So whereas their share 
values are positive, their net income is negative, which constitutes a 
divergence between profits and share values. Both companies hope that their 
large number of users attracts advertisers and financial investors. They 
assume that they will make large profits in the future and that this hope will 
keep investors confident.  
 
The risks these companies face is two-fold: a) They face a highly competitive 
online advertising market, in which Google and Facebook dominate in the 
West and Baidu is a big player in China. b) Microblog communication has an 
immensely high speed and short attention span. It is difficult to place targeted 
ads on them and make users click on them. It is not easy to make profits with 
targeted advertising because the average click-through-rate is around 0.1% 
(Comscore, 2012): users only click on every 1000th online ad presented to 
them. And even then it is not sure if such clicks on targeted ads tend to result 
in purchases or not.  
 
Twitter and Weibo’s political economy is an indication that the social media 
economy is highly financialised and that investments in it are insecure. 
Financial crises can start if finance bubbles burst because there is a large 
divergence between actual profits and stock market valuation and investors 
lose confidence. The dot.com crisis in 2000 was an earlier expression of the 
high financialisation of the Internet economy, in which actual profits could not 
keep up with the promises of high stock market values. A new round of 
financialisation in the Internet industry has enabled the rise of social media 
while the ongoing world economic crisis showed us how crisis-prone financial 
markets are. Targeted advertising is a high-risk business. Users only click on 
a small amount of ads and it is uncertain if and how often they purchase 
something on the landing pages to which they are transferred.  
 
The future of the social media economy in China and the West is uncertain. It 
is clear that it is both in China and the West a highly financialised capitalist 
industry that depends on the influx of investments on finance markets and the 
confidence of advertisers that advertising works. There are many 
uncertainties associated with advertising capital accumulation models, 
especially concerning users’ privacy concerns, the use of ad-block 
technologies and other limits to advertising and the question if targeted ads 
are effective or not. The possibility of a dwindling confidence of investors after 
some trigger event and a resulting social media crisis cannot be ruled out 
because financialising and corporatising the Internet is accompanied by huge 
risks that both China and the West are facing.  
 
Social media needs to be understood in the context of capitalist accumulation, 
financialisation and crisis. But it also has cultural, political and ideological 
dimensions. One question that arises in this context in the context of political 
crisis is what social media’s role is in revolutions. Contemporary capitalism is 
shaped by both crises and political changes. It is no accident that protests and 
political change have intensified and accelerated in the time since the 
capitalism crisis started in 2008. Political changes has in the past years seen 
both progressive progress and new nationalism. Both have been reflected in 
the context of social media. Section 14.5 focuses on protests, section 14.6 on 
an example aspect of the rise of the far-right. 
 
14.5. Social Media Ideology #1: “Twitter and Facebook Revolutions” 
 
Times of economic crisis tend also to be times of a crisis of the state. In such 
situations, protests and revolutions do not necessarily emerge, but are more 
likely. In the course of the protests and revolutions that took place since 2008, 
the techno-determinist ideology that Twitter, Facebook and other social media 
caused such collective political action could often be heard. Even the New 
York Times wrote that the “Egyptian revolution began on Facebook”2.  
 
There is very little serious empirical research about the actual role of social 
media in protests and revolutions. Most published academic works are 
speculative or big data analyses that can say nothing about how prevalent 
social media use was among actual activists who occupied squares.  
 
The OccupyMedia! Survey studied the role of social media in Occupy 
movements. I published its results in the book OccupyMedia! The Occupy 
Movement and Social Media in Crisis Capitalism (Fuchs, 2014c). 429 
respondents, who participated in the Occupy movement, took part in the 







6 times per 
month) 
Frequently 








E-mail 29.8% 40.40% 29.80% 
Phone 36.9% 39.50% 23.60% 
SMS  49.7% 27.00% 23.30% 
E-Mail list 46.2% 29.90% 23.90% 




Twitter 52.0% 15.90% 32.10% 
Table 14.2: Frequency of usage per month of specific forms of 
communication in the mobilisation of protest (data source: Fuchs, 
2014c) 
 
The data indicates that face-to-face communication, Facebook, email, phone, 
SMS and Twitter are the most important media that Occupy activists 
employed for trying to mobilise others for protests. Activists use multiple 
media for mobilisation-oriented communication. These include classical 
interpersonal communication via phones, email, face-to-face and private 
                                                            
2 Spring awakening. How an Egyptian revolution began on Facebook. New York Times Online. 
February 17, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/how-an-egyptian-revolution-
began-on-facebook.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
social media profiles as well as more public forms of communication such as 
Facebook groups, Twitter and email lists.  
 
I also conducted a correlation analysis of the variables that cover protest 
mobilisation communication (Fuchs, 2014c): The frequency of activism tends 
to positively influence the frequency of media use for informing oneself about 
the movement, sharing user-generated content online, communication 
between activists using various media and using media for protest 
mobilisation communication. The use of face-to-face communication and 
online communication tend to mutually reinforce each other. The use of 
various online media for information, the sharing of user-generated content 
and protest mobilisation also tends to mutually reinforce each other. We can 
therefore not say that online communication either determines protest or is 
unimportant. There is a dialectic of online and offline protest communication: 
Activists use multiple online and offline channels for obtaining information, 
discussing protests and trying to mobilise others. Online communication and 
face-to-face communication for these purposes tend to mutually reinforce 
each other. 
 
The next section will show how right-wing ideology has in the contemporary 
crisis not just shaped society, but as a consequence also social media.  
 
14.6. Social Media Ideology #2: Red Scare 2.03 
 
Anti-socialist ideology is at least as old as capitalism. After Marx’s death, 
British right-wing media described Das Kapital as being “repellent in its cold 
formalism” and called Marx the “cold and methodical organiser of the 
International Association of Workers” (The Morning Post, March 19, 1883). 
The “English working men would not care to be identified with these principles 
[of communism] in their bald form” (Leicester Chronicle and the Leicestershire 
Mercury, March 24, 1883). The Times (January 18, 1919) wrote three days 
after Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht had been assassinated about 
Luxemburg: “Had power in Germany fallen into her hands, she would have 
surpassed the reign of terror of the Russian Bolshevists”. This statement 
indirectly welcomes her murder and implies that not her assassination is a 
form of terror, but that her politics were terroristic and that she therefore 
deserved to be killed.  
 
In the 1980s, right-wing British news media characterised the Labour Party-
left and especially the Greater London Council, local London councils, Ken 
Livingstone and Tony Benn, as the “Loony Left”. The term “Loony Left” 
“combines two concepts, insanity and left-wing politics, with a subtext that 
suggests irrational authoritarianism” (Curran, Gaber & Petley, 2005: 229). In 
respect to Tony Benn, the tabloid press spoke of “Dictatorship under Führer 
Benn” (Daily Express, 1/2/75), “Benn The Dictator” (Daily Express, 28/5/81), 
“Citizen Benn who shouts from the rooftops the debt we owe to a man called 
Joseph Stalin” (News of the World, 13/9/81), “the Bennite monster” (Daily 
Mail, 16/1/84), or wrote that “some say Tony Benn is raving bonkers” (The 
                                                            
3 The following section is a short summary of some aspects presented in Fuchs (2016c). 
Sun, 1/3/84) (cited in: Hollingsworth, 1986). Jeremy Corbyn’s win of the 
Labour leadership election in September 2015 was accompanied by the 
return of the Loony Left- and anti-socialist ideology.  
 
I conducted an empirical ideology critique of tweets about Jeremy Corbyn 
during the leadership election. Data were collected with the help of 
Discovertext between August 22 and September 13, 2015, using keywords 
associated with the red scare. The result was a dataset consisting of 32,298 
tweets. General opinions presented without arguments formed an important 
discourse topic in the dataset. One general bias that was frequently 
encountered in this respect was that Corbyn is a “loony” left-winger: 
 
a wet handwringing leftie terrorist supporting anti Semite for Prime 
Minister ?? Corbyn will Drive Brit off a cliff (#242). 
 
the radical extreme left wing lunacy of Jeremy left wing lunacy left wing 
loony lefty extreme radical Corbyn (#438). 
 
Dangerous communist (#1228). 
 
Bloody pinko (#1287). 
 
Corbyn is satan (#4927). 
 
socialist pig (#12741). 
 
When will everyone realise that #Corbyn is a communist bastard? He's 
gonna fuck this country up if he gets in power #Labour (#17405).  
 
Corbyn is a radical left wing idiot (#17528). 
 
Corbyn is a left wing socialist scumbag (#20456). 
 
Single tweets even expressed the wish that Corbyn is killed because he is 
left-wing: 
 
Jeremy Corbyn ..... A communist fraud....... hope he goes the way of 
Trotsky #Mexico1941 #NeverForget (#15440) 
 
The sensationalist right-wing anti-Corbyn Twitter-discourse was not simply 
accepted, but contested. There were various strategies that Corbyn 
supporters used for challenging anti-socialist ideology online. One was that 
they associated Corbyn with positive general characteristics: “He seems to be 
about common sense and decency and so very normal/nice” (#422), “he is 
sensible, clear, knowledgeable & decent” (#606), “In my view he just preaches 
common sense” (#22591), 
 
A second strategy was to use the strategy of discursive dialectical reversal: 
The argument made in this strategy is that not Corbyn, but the Tories are 





Figure 14.7: A Twitter-critique of the BBC Panorma documentary on 
Corbyn that uses visual dialectical reversals by showing images of 
Gordon Brown and Tony Blair with Gaddafi, Blair with Assad, and 
Thatcher with Pinochet. 
 
A third strategy was to use satire and humour to ridicule anti-socialist 
ideology. It is based on the insight that ideologies are often irrational and 
emotional. They are difficult to challenge by rational arguments. The hashtag 
#suggestacorbynsmear that emerged on Twitter on August 31, 2015, and was 
used within 24 hours more than 11,000 times4 is an example. Examples: 
“Jeremy Corbyn shares the letter 'n' with Stalin and Satan, and the letters 'e' 
and 'r' with Hitler! #suggestacorbynsmear” (#5229), “Jeremy Corbyn was born 
in 1949. Stalin was alive in 1949. Coincidence? I think not. 
#suggestacorbynsmear” (5251). 
 
Ideologies are semiotic structures that justify domination. Twitter limits 
linguistic expression to 140 characters. Twitter’s brevity is an expression of 
high-speed capitalist consumer culture. User-generated ideology such as 
online redbaiting therefore has to compress ideology. User-generated 
ideology is the use of digital media for producing and spreading semiotic 
structures that justify domination by distorting reality, misrepresenting it, or 
inventing false representations of reality. By making claims, insults and 
personal attacks without underlying arguments and justifications, users 
compress ideology on Twitter into 140 characters. A feature of many anti-
                                                            
4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/Jeremy_Corbyn/11836904/Twitters-funniest-smear-
attacks-on-Jeremy-Corbyn-as-suggestacorbynsmear-goes-viral.html  
socialist tweets was that they made claims about Corbyn without arguments 
and proof. 
 
Users are not the helpless victims of anti-socialist and other ideologies, but 
can contest, oppose and struggle against ideologies. Social media is a 
communication space where ideologies are expressed and challenged. 
Studying user-generated ideologies online therefore allows identifying and 
analysing the structure of anti-socialist and anti-Corbyn ideologies and how 
they can best be challenged. 
 
Left-wing social media users have developed intelligent strategies of how to 
react to ideological smear campaigns. Studying counter-discourses to anti-
socialist ideology can inform political campaigns at a time when redbaiting is 




Society shapes and is shaped by communications technologies and society. 
There is a dialectic of media and society. In an antagonistic society, new 
information and communication technologies will therefore display an 
antagonistic logic. A critical theory and critique of the political economy of 
communications and the media tries to understand the contradictions of 
society and communications.  
 
This chapter has investigated causes of the crisis of capitalism. This crisis is 
not a crisis of regulation, but a fundamental economic crisis that has emerged 
from capitalism’s inherent contradictions. The economic crisis has also turned 
into political and cultural crises, for example a crisis of the European idea and 
European politics. On the level of communications, crises tend to manifest 
themselves in various ways. The focus of this chapter was social media in the 
context of capitalism’s crisis: Capitalism’s crisis has favoured the expansion of 
targeted online advertising. In the realm of politics, social media 
communication and offline communication are two interacting forms of protest 
communication. The strengthening of right-wing extremism has resulted in 
various forms of far-right ideology and nationalism online (see Fuchs, 2016a, 
2016b, for two detailed studies of ideology 2.0).  
 
Social media are in complex ways embedded into the contradictions of 
capitalist society, economy, politics and ideology. As a consequence, social 
media are incompletely social and are shaped by the logic of instrumental 
reason that turns such communications into forms of domination and 
exploitation. Only social struggles can develop potentials of communications 
and society that communalise both society and the media so that social media 




Curran, J., Petley, J. & Gaber, I. (2005) Culture wars. Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Fisher, E. and Fuchs, C., eds., (2015). Reconsidering value and labour in the 
digital age. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fuchs, C. (2017) Fascism 2.0: Twitter Users’ Social Media Memories of Hitler 
on His 127th birthday. Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies, 
forthcoming. 
Fuchs, C. (2016a) Racism, nationalism and right-wing extremism online: The 
Austrian presidential election 2016 on Facebook. Momentum Quarterly – 
Zeitschrift für sozialen Fortschritt (Journal for Societal Progress). 5 (3), 172-
196. 
Fuchs, C. (2016b) Reading Marx in the information age: A media and 
communication studies perspective on “Capital Volume I”. New York, 
Routledge. 
Fuchs, C. (2016c) Red Scare 2.0: User-Generated Ideology in the Age of 
Jeremy Corbyn and Social Media. Journal of Language and Politics. 15 (4), 
369-398.  
Fuchs, C. (2015) Culture and economy in the age of social media. New York, 
Routledge. 
Fuchs, C. (2014a) Digital labour and Karl Marx. New York, Routledge. 
Fuchs, C. (2014b) OccupyMedia! The Occupy movement and social media in 
crisis capitalism. Winchester, Zero Books. 
Fuchs, C. (2014c) Social media: A critical introduction. London, Sage. 
Fuchs, C. & Mosco, V., eds., (2016) Marx in the age of digital capitalism. 
Studies in critical social sciences, Volume 80. Leiden, Brill. 
Fuchs, C. & Sandoval, M., eds. (2014) Critique, social media and the 
information society. New York, Routledge. 
Fuchs, C., Boersma, K., Albrechtslund, A. & Sandoval, M., eds. (2012) 
Internet and surveillance. The challenges of web 2.0 and social media. 
New York, Routledge.  
Hollingsworth, M. (1986) The press and political dissent. London: Pluto. 
Marx, K. (1867) Capital Volume 1. London, Penguin. 
Ofcom (2014) International Communications Market Report 2014. [online] 
Available from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr14/icmr/ICMR_
2014.pdf [Accessed 21st October 2016] 
Ofcom (2015) The Communications Market Report 2015 [UK]. [online] 
Available from: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr15/CMR_UK_2
015.pdf [Accessed 21st October 2016] 
Trottier, D. & Fuchs, C., eds., (2014) Social media, politics and the state: 
Protests, revolutions, riots, crime and policing in the age of Facebook, 
Twitter and YouTube. New York, Routledge. 
